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Beyond the Traditional Intelligence Agenda: Examining the Merits of a 
Global Public Health Portfolio 
by Loch K. Johnson and Diane C. Snyder 
The traditional idea of intelligence is the spy who provides the enemy's war plans. 
Actually, intelligence is concerned not only with war plans, but with all the external 
concerns of our government.1  
INTRODUCTION  
Since the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, the modern 
American intelligence community - comprised of thirteen major federal agencies - has 
focused on a set of traditional requirements for collection and analysis. The preeminent 
targets have included foreign military capabilities and intentions, the politics and 
economics of other countries, and worldwide mapping (mainly for military 
contingencies). Throughout the Cold War these topics as they related to the Soviet Union 
- the only unfriendly nation capable at the time of destroying the United States with 
nuclear weapons - understandably consumed a majority of America's intelligence 
resources. With the breakup of the USSR, the focus of America's intelligence agencies 
shifted dramatically away from the former Soviet republics (which now draw only an 
estimated 15 percent of this nation's intelligence resources)2 and toward a host of other 
nations and factions that threaten the United States. These targets range from "rogue" 
countries like Iraq and North Korea to terrorist groups and weapons proliferators.  
In this new era, some government officials and outside experts have questioned whether 
the attention of the CIA and its companion agencies should remained fixed on traditional 
intelligence requirements. As the danger from Russian tanks and ICBMs has receded, 
they point to fresh perils, as well as to lingering threats never given adequate attention by 
policy makers during the Cold War. Thus, the debate has begun over how the pie should 
be divided with respect to finite intelligence resources in the post-Cold War era.3  
This article examines a slice of that debate, namely, whether the new intelligence agenda 
should include greater attention to global health issues. More specifically, it attempts to 
appraise the desirability of channeling increased resources of the US intelligence 
agencies toward global disease surveillance and analysis - "public health intelligence." 
This encompasses issues ranging from the threat posed to American security by 
pandemics (at the macro-level) to the health of foreign elites whose governments are 
important to US interests (at the micro-level).  
IN SEARCH OF A POST-COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE AGENDA  
In 1994, the Congress joined with President Bill Clinton to create a Commission on the 
Roles and Capabilities of US Intelligence (the Aspin-Brown Commission, led initially by 
Les Aspin and, after he passed away, by Harold Brown, both former secretaries of 
defense). The enacting legislation required the commissioners to investigate:  
Whether the roles and missions of the intelligence community should extend beyond the 
traditional areas of providing support to the defense and foreign policy establishments, 
and, if so, what areas should be considered legitimate for intelligence collection and 
analysis, and whether such areas should include, for example, economic issues, 
environmental issues, and health issues.4
The Aspin-Brown Commission was only one of several panels of inquiry, public and 
private, to consider the question of intelligence options for the United States in the 
aftermath of the Cold War.5 Although often referred to as the "New Intelligence Agenda," 
the topics examined by these study groups were in fact not new at all to the intelligence 
agencies. Economic intelligence had been a subject of interest to policy makers and, 
therefore, to intelligence officers throughout the Cold War. US intelligence had closely 
monitored Soviet dumping of radioactive wastes in the Arctic circle, the drying up of the 
Aral Sea between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and a variety of other environmental 
concerns.  
Still, non-traditional intelligence topics were largely relegated to the CIA's back burner 
during the Cold War. Intelligence managers dipped into this small budget to cope with 
their more immediate responsibilities for helping to contain the global communist threat. 
As the Cold War began to wind down, however, resources once targeted against the 
communist threat became increasingly available for the New Intelligence Agenda. Yet, 
the back burner is precisely where many critics (inside and outside the intelligence 
community) would like to banish these new priorities. From their point of view, military 
and proliferation threats, such as the whereabouts of Russia missiles and warheads, 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing, Iraqi and North Korean nuclear weapons production, 
and the sale of Chinese missiles to Pakistan, must remain the primary concern of officials 
responsible for the protection of the American people.6  
Moreover, in reaction to the runaway defense spending of both superpowers during the 
Cold War, US government officials have turned to the challenge of bringing the budget 
back into balance and drawing down the national debt. This mitigates against an 
expansion of intelligence requirements that lack a strong consensus in their favor and 
whose direct relationship to national security and foreign policy may not be as readily 
apparent as warheads and missiles in the hands of rogue nations. "Just say no!" is the 
private declaration of many intelligence officers who feel overwhelmed by the list of 
fresh collection and analysis requirements that continues to grow without concomitant 
resources to fill them.  
In sharp contrast, other observers maintain that Americans can no longer afford to define 
this nation's security in narrow, traditional terms. If the ozone layer erodes, if the rain 
forests vanish, if the Ebola virus spreads across continents, or, for that matter, if a large 
asteroid strikes the planet, the American people may be just as endangered - or dead - as 
they would have been under a massive Soviet nuclear attack during the Cold War. To 
define the nation's security strictly in terms of foreign military dangers is, so this 
argument runs, delusionary. An obsession with the USSR obscured our attention to these 
other dangers, but now they can be addressed; old fashioned views of threat assessment 
must undergo new definition in the climate of uncertainty that characterizes the post-Cold 
War world.7 As one specialist puts it with respect to public health intelligence, 
"Infectious diseases are potentially the largest threat to human security lurking in the 
post-Cold War world."8  
As for balancing the budget (continues the argument in favor of monitoring New 
Intelligence Agenda threats), the fresh set of targets can be covered in part by reorienting 
technical systems - satellites, for instance - once directed toward the USSR. Many 
maintain as well that the United States has invested too much money in gold-plated 
collection systems ("platforms") equipped with every conceivable bell and whistle. An 
official at the National Security Agency (NSA), for instance, has accused the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) of "building Cadillacs" instead of smaller satellites that 
could meet America's security needs just as well.9  
Better intelligence about the new topics can actually save money, according to some 
reports. The President's Office of Science and Technology Policy has calculated that the 
lack of early warning about a resurgence of drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) 
"undoubtedly contributed to the more than $700 million in direct costs for TB treatment 
incurred [by the United States] in 1991 alone." The office adds that surveillance of this 
form of tuberculosis "was not reinstated until 1993, by which time multi-drug-resistant 
TB had become a public health crisis and millions of Federal dollars had been 
allocated."10  
Support for attention to non-traditional intelligence topics comes from the highest levels 
of government. In a report on "The National Security Science and Technology Strategy," 
issued in 1996 under the guidance of the National Science and Technology Council (a 
Cabinet-level panel), President Bill Clinton stated that "no country is isolated from the 
consequences of newly emerging diseases, environmental degradation, or other global 
threats - even if the roots of these problems lie in distant parts of the world." As an 
example, he offered "the tragedy of AIDS [acquired immunodeficiency syndrome]."11  
This was not the first expression of presidential concern about the AIDS pandemic. In the 
mid-1980s, President Ronald Reagan issued a directive ordering federal agencies to 
develop a model that could predict the global spread of AIDS and its demographic 
effects. Working under the auspices of the State Department, the CIA led this research in 
cooperation with a number of other government entities (including the Departments of 
Energy and Defense).12 The initial focus was on Africa (where the AIDS epidemic 
originated), as researchers sorted out the infected groups according to such standard 
demographic variables as age, gender, and rural-urban residence. The model was 
subsequently expanded to include Latin America and Asia, taking into account as well 
infection by the AIDS virus (HIV) through intravenous drug use, homosexual 
transmission, and blood transfusion.13  
Clearly, the global resurgence of disease has failed to ebb, despite one's hopes in this age 
of advanced medical knowledge.14 Yellow fever haunts Benin; viral meningitis has 
surfaced in Romania, polio in Albania, cholera in the Philippines; bubonic and 
pneumonic plague in India; and tuberculosis has undergone a worldwide resurgence. As 
reported by the World Health Organization (WHO, an arm of the United Nations), 
malaria, plague, diphtheria, cholera, yellow fever, and dengue have re-emerged around 
the globe.15 Moreover, at least 33 new disease-causing organisms have been identified 
since 1976, including HIV, hepatitis C, the Ebola virus, sabia, and rotavirus, along with 
the development and spread of previously unseen strains of bacteria resistant to 
antibiotics.16 These diseases obey no border guards. As the White House has warned:  
Diseases affecting humans, plants, and animals are spreading rapidly as a result of trade 
and travel and, especially when combined with malnutrition, threaten public health and 
productivity on a broad scale. The rapidly growing human population, widespread 
pollution, and the deterioration of other environmental factors that contribute to the 
maintenance of good health, as well as the lack of dependable supplies of clean drinking 
water for fully a fifth of the world's people, contribute to the acceleration and spread of 
such diseases.17  
It goes without saying that concern over world health risks must not diminish America's 
vigilance against potential military threats from abroad - priority number one on the 
traditional intelligence agenda. We continue to live in a time when weapons of mass 
destruction remain plentiful; the specter of swift and devastating carnage to entire 
civilizations still stalks the planet, as does the prospect of a terrorist attack using chemical 
or biological agents. Nor can the United States afford to ignore budget imbalances that 
have threatened bankruptcy of the American people.  
Yet, concerns about new dangers to the United States cannot be ignored either. The topics 
mandated for investigation by the Aspin-Brown Commission are hardly inconsequential; 
they warrant close scrutiny by policy makers and the public they serve, if US officials are 
to make thoughtful judgments about competing intelligence resource priorities. Among 
these post-Cold War claimants for additional intelligence resources is one that is perhaps 
the least well understood of all: global public health intelligence.  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH INTELLIGENCE  
At first blush, it is easy to dismiss public health intelligence as a topic of limited 
relevance. After all, the United States already has more medical journals and more Nobel 
laureates for medicine than any other country; the open literature, scientific and popular, 
on health threats is vast. Moreover, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Carter 
Center (both based in Atlanta) monitor and report on health conditions and threats 
throughout the world. So does the United Nations, as well as a scattering of private 
organizations like the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).  
With all the open sources of information on possible threats to the physical well-being of 
Americans, why devote limited intelligence resources to this subject? Even the Aspin-
Brown Commission, which endorsed the proposition that a "legitimate role for 
intelligence" existed within the health domain, devoted only a quarter-page to the topic in 
a 151-page report and offered virtually no evidence to support its endorsement.18  
Health Intelligence Scenarios  
Nonetheless, as one begins to probe beneath the surface of the limited information 
available on this subject, one realizes that public health intelligence bears more serious 
attention than it has thus far received. Imagine the following scenarios:  
A Third World nation with mineral resources important to the US industrial base has an 
alarming recent history of AIDS spreading throughout its population. Indeed, about one-
third of the children born in the nation's capital city in the previous year began life with 
HIV in their bloodstreams. The National Security Council (NSC) is concerned about the 
stability of the regime (presently pro-US), since some of the ruling council appear to have 
symptoms of the AIDS disease. The President's national security adviser wants to know 
to what extent the higher echelons of the foreign government have been infected by AIDS 
and the likely effect this will have on the regime's stability.  
The CDC does not collect information about foreign leaders; and, even if it did, many 
countries hide the truth about the prevalence of AIDS within their own borders and 
certainly within their own ruling councils. Further, the CDC and its staff would lack the 
qualifications to write an accompanying analysis on the political, economic and military 
implications.  
The Secretary of State is concerned about widespread unrest in another Third World 
country that seems to be a result of extensive poverty and disease. Particularly disquieting 
is the near endemic nature of debilitating intestinal afflictions in its northern territories. 
The Secretary wants an analysis of what might be causing the illnesses. This information 
may be available somewhere in UN files, but she wants it right away and with an analysis 
that will explain the implications for American foreign policy. The Secretary is especially 
concerned about the potential of infected populations moving across national borders into 
neighboring states, further spreading the disease.  
American troops are ordered by the President to join a UN peacemaking mission in the 
heart of Central Africa. Among the responsibilities of the field commander is to ensure 
the safety of the troops against local contagious diseases. He requires up-to-date 
information on what to expect. Some of this data are available in the open domain, but 
part of the military action is apt to take place in a remote jungle where few Western 
medical experts have traveled. The commander needs to know what inoculations and 
other precautions are necessary to keep his troops healthy - and he needs to know 
immediately. His counterparts who will be dealing with humanitarian aid have the same 
concerns; their workers must also be protected from indigenous health risks.  
The President has just read a techno-thriller about a member of a Middle East terrorist 
faction who leases a Twin Otter airplane from a small airport in the Virginia countryside, 
heads for Washington, DC, and drops a fine rain of anthrax spores out the window from a 
suitcase while flying at low altitude along the Smithsonian Mall in the nation's capital. In 
the novel, the attack proves fatal within forty-eight hours to almost everyone inside the 
Beltway. The President wants to know how farfetched this scenario is, along with a full 
report on anthrax and other biological materials that could cause death to Americans 
targeted by a terrorist attack. He also wants to know what can be done to guard against 
such contingencies, as well as the history of international agreements on the control of 
biological substances. He further directs the Department of Defense and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to determine whether the US government is 
working to develop easily accessible antidotes available to the citizens in case of a 
terrorist strike using disease-inducing substances. These agencies in turn request from the 
intelligence community a full report on the threat of biological terrorism.19  
The Secretary of State is expected to attend a worldwide conference on the health dangers 
to citizens and military combatants when environments are destroyed as a byproduct of 
warfare. Of particular interest to conferees is likely to be the effect of toxic gases released 
in the aftermath of environmental damage incurred during war, as took place during the 
Persian Gulf conflict in 1991. She requests an immediate intelligence report on the 
subject.20  
The Secretary of Defense wants to know if his counterpart in a certain Asian nation is 
mentally unstable (as rumored), or in fact someone with whom he can deal. He wants, in 
short, a psychological profile of the foreign minister of defense, prepared before his 
meeting with him scheduled in a fortnight. For this mental health information, the 
secretary has no place to go except to the US intelligence agencies.21  
One does not have to be a Chicken Little to worry about these and related scenarios, 
although some are obviously more likely and immediate than others. After all, 240 people 
died in Zaire in 1995 during an Ebola outbreak, whose potential for spread alarmed US 
officials. There was also the risk of an Ebola outbreak in the United States in 1989 from 
diseased monkeys housed in a medical facility in Reston, Virginia, near Washington, 
DC.22 Moreover, we have experienced worldwide concern recently over an outbreak of 
"Bird Flu" in Hong Kong (1997).23 Researchers have pointed as well to a relationship 
between a nation's health conditions and its degree of political stability. With respect to 
the AIDS pandemic, for instance, medical writer Laurie Garrett notes that as early as 
1988 economists envisioned the creation of "a global underclass" and "an economic 
disaster" in Africa as a result of  
the direct costs of AIDS care, HIV-testing costs, a year's supply of condoms, AZT 
(azidothymine) and other drugs for opportunistic infections (where such pharmaceuticals 
were at all available); and loss of net industrial and agricultural productivity due to 
deceased work force.24  
Responding to the requirements - sometimes the urgent demands - of policy makers for 
accurate information on selected world health problems, the intelligence community has 
established a history of activity in this domain that predates the post-Cold War agenda 
concerns about global disease surveillance and analysis. Policy makers understand that 
relying on media reporting alone with respect to world health problems is insufficient. 
Foreign governments sometimes will try to conceal health dangers from foreign 
correspondents, as witnessed recently in the cover-up by Chinese military leaders and 
Communist Party officials of an AIDS-contaminated blood product (serum albumin) 
manufactured by a military-run factory in China.25 The purpose of clandestine 
intelligence collection is to help ferret out such hidden information.  
Macro-Level Health Concerns  
The intelligence agencies are expected to tackle the question of health conditions in entire 
countries and regions. Some observers believe, for example, that Russia's greatest 
challenge presently is not so much economic or military reform but the health of its 
citizens. Thanks in large part to a high rate of vodka consumption, Russia's male 
population is suffering high mortality rates, leading some analysts to predict that rampant 
alcoholism may prevent Russia from ever achieving the economic and political reforms 
to which it aspires.26  
Long before discussion of a New Intelligence Agenda emerged in the wake of the Cold 
War, the intelligence community generated studies on country, regional, and indeed 
global health trends, supplementing UN, CDC, and other public reporting with 
information from so-called all-source collection (that is, open as well as clandestine). One 
of the strong contributions made by government intelligence analysts is the skillful 
blending of open information (roughly 80 percent of the total in most cases) with secret 
"nuggets" from espionage channels - something no one else is in a position to do.  
Separating the wheat from the chaff in the open information, that is validating what is 
truly reliable in the public record, can be an enormously valuable but often difficult task 
in itself. Is a particular city in Bosnia actually under siege, as reported (let us say) by a 
European correspondent? What is an accurate population estimate for the city, counting 
fresh waves of refugees, so that the amount of humanitarian aid flown in will fit the city's 
needs without creating surpluses that will foster a black market? What is the quality of 
the drinking water in the city? Is the report of the European correspondent accurate about 
an outbreak of cholera in the city's main hospital? How much and what kinds of 
medicines are available in the hospital?  
On the list of health topics analyzed by the US intelligence agencies in the past have been 
studies on the access of foreign peoples in developing countries to safe drinking water 
and adequate sanitation. The underlying assumption was that a populace whose physical 
and mental well-being is under stress is vulnerable to radical political movements and 
other manifestations of social and political unrest. That, in turn, could undermine the 
stability of a foreign regime and, therefore, possibly affect America's interests.27 Another 
topic of increasing concern is the spread of HIV in foreign countries, which is so 
extensive that it may well begin to erode the stability of some regimes. In Janeiro, Zaire, 
for instance, 23 percent of the babies born in 1990 reportedly had the AIDS virus.28 
American intelligence units have also gathered information from around the world on 
medical concerns related to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, data that are 
shared with UN and NATO officials. Of recent special concern have been the preparation 
of assessments on the incidence and the effects of HIV and AIDS on foreign military 
forces with whom the United States must work shoulder-to-shoulder in the field, as well 
as possible hazards to American soldiers from having to handle HIV-infected prisoners of 
war or American civilians involved in the humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping 
missions.29  
The intelligence agencies also keep tabs on environmental health dangers. The accident 
that occurred in 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, located in the Soviet Ukraine, 
provides an example. In the region near the stricken plant, cancer cases have doubled and 
calves are born routinely without heads and limbs. Radioactive particles from the 
Chernobyl melt-down have been tracked as far away as Scandinavia. One ranking UN 
official estimates that "up to 40 potential Chernobyls are waiting to happen in the former 
Soviet Union and Central Europe."30 What if another Chernobyl were to occur? What 
would be the health implications for US personnel and citizens traveling or living in 
Europe, and for America's allies?  
A related concern is biological warfare. While beyond the scope of this analysis, the 
federal government is well aware of the serious risks faced by US troops abroad. 
"Reversing earlier opposition, the nation's military chiefs have endorsed a plan to 
vaccinate all US forces against anthrax in what would be the Pentagon's first regular 
inoculation program against a germ warfare agent," the Washington Post reported in 
1996. "The about-face . . . reflects heightened Pentagon concern about the prospect of 
biological attack. Iraq, Russia and as many as ten other countries are said by US officials 
to have at least the capability to load spores of anthrax into weapons, although no country 
is known to have released the bacteria on a battlefield."31  
While much information on global health threats is in the public domain, someone has to 
ferret it out of obscure UN documents and data bases or other archives (sometimes in 
difficult foreign languages) and collate it into a readable - ideally, an eye-catching - 
format that will attract and hold the attention of busy policy makers. Equally important, 
someone must ensure that the information addresses the current in-box demands on the 
most prominent desks scattered around Washington. The UN does not do this for 
Washington officialdom; the CDC and the Carter Center do not; the government's various 
hospitals do not; the Library of Congress does not; the Brookings Institution, RAND, the 
Heritage Foundation, the Aspen Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute do not. 
So when the information is needed, the intelligence community is expected to have it, and 
it must be accurate, timely and focused on the latest problem or crisis.  
RESOURCES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH INTELLIGENCE  
Despite all the hoopla over the New Intelligence Agenda, global health concerns have 
received only limited support. America's budget woes have resulted in significant draw 
downs of US intelligence personnel overseas, along with the closing of many 
installations, especially in Africa, where many of the worst infectious diseases germinate. 
The United States in the post-Cold War era has shifted from a condition of "global 
presence" (eyes and ears in every country) to "global reach," that is, a policy of 
mobilizing resources when necessary to "surge" collection capabilities against targets of 
imminent concern.  
In this time of budget reductions (at least for human intelligence collection, if not for the 
ongoing infatuation with expensive surveillance satellites, none of which can discern the 
spread of an infection disease), health is a "tasking" priority far down the list of 
intelligence collection concerns for Washington decision makers. Nonetheless, by 1996 
the CIA had established a Conflict Issues Division within the Intelligence Directorate's 
newly established office of Transnational Security and Technological Issues. Here a 
dozen analysts track health and humanitarian issues, from the spread of global diseases to 
the (sometimes related) flow of refugees.32  
At times the open media will report accurately on global health issues, as when Reuters 
documented that hundreds of Rwandan Hutu refugees had died daily of cholera in eastern 
Zaire during the summer of 1994.33 Often, though, foreign correspondents are not in the 
right place at the right time, or they may fail to focus on the health side of a story and its 
implications for US security interests. Then collection and analysis by intelligence 
agencies become all the more important.  
The US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and the 
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (USAFMIC) play significant roles in 
monitoring global health conditions that may impinge upon peacekeeping operations, 
humanitarian and rescue missions, and other US military operations abroad (either alone 
or in coalition with UN or NATO forces).34 Their primary missions are to identify health 
threats to the warfighter. Their funding is modest, too, and frequently their integration 
into the intelligence process is inadequate - particularly in terms of tasking (collection 
targeting) and subsequent sharing of information for the production of community-wide 
("all source") reports.  
While efforts have been made to upgrade the intelligence community's attention to health 
intelligence, sometimes the left hand has been unaware of what the right hand is doing. 
This is a persistent problem facing the vast and loosely connected intelligence 
bureaucracy (the largest interagency cooperative venture in the government) spread out 
around Washington. In recognition of the more complicated nature of world affairs in the 
post-Cold War era, the community has expanded its concentration on global and 
multilateral issues, including health concerns. The government's premier entity for 
intelligence analysis is the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which is located at CIA 
Headquarters but staffed by "superanalysts" - called National Intelligence Officers 
(NIOs) - recruited from throughout the community, as well as from some selected 
universities and think tanks.  
In 1993, the NIC created a new NIO position for global issues, with health-related topics 
folded into the portfolio of the woman selected to handle this oversized basket of 
responsibilities.35 The NIC also has produced from time to time National Intelligence 
Estimates (NIEs - the community's major research reports and forecasts on selected world 
issues) which have a health focus.36  
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH INTELLIGENCE  
From a strategic perspective, health issues are - in our view - a less important focus for 
the intelligence community than traditional military, political and economic collection 
requirements. Foreign diseases, it is true, can infect American soldiers; but Russian 
missiles continue to have the capacity to annihilate our entire society (even if, for the 
moment, they may not be targeted in our direction). Moreover, a resumption of fighting 
in the Balkans could spread throughout Central Europe and once again engulf the 
Western powers in a global war. Terrorists continue their cowardly attacks on civilian 
and military targets. Political unrest in Mexico can produce additional waves of 
immigrants across the Rio Grande. International economic conditions can directly affect 
the living standards of Americans. These things are of more immediate concern to the US 
government. Still, health risks to American soldiers serving overseas can hardly be 
casually dismissed. Nor can one blithely push aside the other health concerns discussed in 
this study, even if limitations on available resources prohibit a full coverage of every 
possible risk to the health and well-being of Americans.  
The need to keep public health intelligence in proper perspective, without ignoring its 
obvious importance, leads us to this central policy conclusion: in a time of government 
downsizing and budget reductions, it is vital to preserve the current levels of funding for 
health intelligence (as the Aspin-Brown Commission concluded as well, however 
elliptically).  
We also believe (and on this point the Aspin-Brown Commission was silent) that without 
appreciable cost, some improvements can be made to provide better information to policy 
makers on global health risks to America's security interests. This will require 
cooperation among groups unaccustomed to working together or even being in the same 
room.  
First, the CIA and the other intelligence agencies must take the health portfolio more 
seriously. The Directorate of Operations (DO - home of the CIA's case officers who 
recruit and handle agents overseas) should report more regularly and systematically from 
the field on country and regional health trends, which presently are neglected in the cable 
traffic sent back to CIA headquarters.37 Case officers should pay closer attention to the 
spread of infectious diseases among foreign political and military elites.  
The DO cannot cover the international health beat alone, however. Since the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is to have an increased presence overseas to fight 
international crime,38 it should also be called upon to tap Bureau assets for information 
regarding global public health concerns, as well as the physical and mental status of 
foreign elites. This would represent an expansion of the FBI's traditional investigative 
mandate, yet only in the narrow sense of passing along to the CIA information on foreign 
health matters that have been picked up by Bureau assets abroad.  
Second, the proper threshold for triggering collection on health matters - whether global, 
regional, national, group, or individual in focus - requires further refinement. The system 
is presently too ad hoc; the intelligence community has yet to work out explicit and 
systematic triggering criteria that would indicate when a health issue has reached the 
level of national security significance, for example, by virtue of disease lethality, 
proximity to US interests, or communicability. As with every intelligence topic, analysts 
and managers throughout the intelligence community must redouble their efforts to learn 
what types of global health issues most concern policy makers. What is in the decision 
maker's in-box - right now - related to world health topics?  
Further, the integration of clandestine reporting and open-source material on world health 
conditions is presently inadequate. Since a considerable amount of health data surfaces in 
the public domain, the policy maker's request for information may be satisfied quickly by 
way of the community's capacity for open-source data searches, without engaging in 
clandestine collection methods. In the case of certain public health threats, WHO and the 
CDC already serve as important centers for what the intelligence community would refer 
to as "indications and warning" (I&W), providing quick alerts on global health dangers. 
The intelligence community should monitor more closely the open publications of these 
and other health entities that have a global focus, turning to its own secret collection 
capabilities just for those topics that remain unreported (such as the health of specific 
foreign leaders, the presence of disease in potential battlefields, or the risk of biological 
weapons use).39  
A basic I&W question is: how much warning is enough? Just as for a missile attack, the 
rapid dissemination of accurate information about global health threats - a kind of "viral 
telemetry" - is essential. Officials in the intelligence community responsible for tracking 
open-source information need to mine more effectively the data banks and eyewitness 
accounts of individuals who work on health-related missions abroad for non-
governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations.  
The community's relationship to private groups must be handled gingerly, though. As one 
FAS scientist has observed: "We are in communication with DoD [Department of 
Defense] officials and are, of course, aware of the value of disease surveillance data to 
the intelligence community; [however], we - and they - recognize that any overt 
involvement by DoD or intelligence [in the data-collection activities of these civilian 
groups] would kill the effort to monitor effectively."40  
The intelligence community's health data bank is presently inadequate. The CIA's 
sophisticated in-house computer system charged with scanning the public-source 
literature (known as ROSE, for Rich Open Source Environment) fails to have among its 
machine-readable subscription lists many of the key specialized publications from private 
and international governmental organizations dealing with health and medical subjects. 
For very little investment, the ROSE system could be further enriched with open source 
disease data useful for both an early warning and full understanding of global health 
dangers.  
Third, the intelligence community should shift some resources from collection against 
conventional military targets toward the more probable danger to the United States of a 
terrorist attack employing biological weapons. An inadequate number of human 
intelligence agents is targeted currently against foreign chemical-biological warfare 
capabilities and intentions. Further, more research on antidotes and the preparation of 
nationwide defenses is necessary, with private industry, the Department of Defense, and 
the intelligence agencies working in tandem (as they have so well in satellite and 
reconnaissance aircraft development over the years). "Our ultimate goal," states a recent 
White House report, "is to foster the creation of a worldwide disease surveillance and 
response network."41 This laudable objective warrants more resources to match the 
rhetoric.  
Fourth, the tasking and analytic integration of clandestine health intelligence cries out for 
better coordination. Several federal agencies have given some attention to public health 
intelligence, but the cross-walks between them are few and far between. The FBI, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the US Public Health Service, for 
example, have put together a crisis-management plan to cope with a chemical/ biological 
terrorist attack, but "there has been relatively little emphasis on devising practical 
measures for protecting public health in the event of such an attack."42  
The current fragmentation of efforts could be alleviated by the creation of a Task Force 
on Global Disease Surveillance and Analysis, under the auspices of the Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI). The Task Force might be expected to convene at least twice a 
year to review current world health issues and to determine how well the intelligence 
community has been sharing its responsibilities for collection, data analysis, and final 
product dissemination related to these issues. Members of the task force might well 
include:  
the NIO for Global Issues (who would chair the panel and report directly to the DCI);  
a representative from the CIA's Directorate of Operations with knowledge of clandestine 
collection methods related to public health intelligence;  
a global-health analyst from the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence;  
representatives from the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency;  
a representative from the Department of State;  
a representative from the FBI;  
a representative from the US Customs Service;  
a representative from the Immigration and Naturalization Service;  
a representative from both the AFMIC and the USAMRIID;  
a representative from FEMA;  
a representative from the US Public Health Service;  
a physician/researcher from the CDC;  
an academic medical expert with extensive international experience; and,  
the NSC staff aide with responsibilities for global health issues.  
One of the key issues for the Task Force to consider would be who needs to know what 
and when about potential disease threats, especially when the territory of the United 
States itself is threatened. That is, exactly who are the key potential consumers of this 
form of intelligence? The intelligence agencies must do a better job of informing policy 
makers about health dangers that have been uncovered by agents in the field, as well as 
what analytic reports are presently available on this subject.  
As matters presently stand, often the wrong information is gathered because of 
inadequate communications between the consumers of intelligence (the policy makers) 
and its producers (the intelligence agencies). All too frequently in our research, we have 
come across evidence that one part of the government was not aware of what another 
related part is doing, even at high echelons. Recently, for instance, a senior NSC staffer 
had never met the key NIO dealing with global health and environmental issues, even 
though both had been in their respective positions for almost a year.  
At the heart of successful intelligence support to decision makers on matters of global 
health - as for every other policy subject - lies the problem of dialogue. When dialogue 
exists, ideally with intelligence liaisons or analysts in attendance at the policy makers's 
morning staff meetings and afternoon coffee breaks, intelligence has a much better 
chance of meeting two of its most important obligations: relevance and timeliness.43  
Further, while the United States already has procedures in place to deal with health 
threats when the warning comes from public sources, less adequately worked out is the 
manner in which clandestinely derived disease warnings should be disseminated to the 
civilian population in times of an emergency involving a health danger (such as a terrorist 
attack employing biological substances).  
CONCLUSION  
Foreign policy traditionalists will continue to focus on issues of balance-of-power with 
respect to the world's major military forces. This is a sensible concern, as it always has 
been since the advent of nation states. International affairs, though, have become more 
complicated in recent years. The Clinton administration's first Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, had it right when he warned in 1996 that the greatest future threat to 
America's national security is likely to come from a host of "transnational issues," among 
them environmental stress, population growth, narcotics flows, and infectious diseases.44  
While continuing to monitor weapons systems that can cause us great harm, America's 
intelligence agencies must also expand their responsibilities to include the New 
Intelligence Agenda topics. President George Bush once referred to intelligence as 
America's "first line of defense."45 Clearly the first line of defense against the outbreak of 
infectious disease is global surveillance of health conditions. To be successful in this 
endeavor, the intelligence community must receive the necessary support - not from new 
monies in this time of economic belt-tightening, but through improved efficiencies along 
with the shifting of funds away from outdated Cold War activities and profligate 
spending on gold-plated collection platforms.  
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